- The Department of Justice’s National Fraud Enforcement Division (“NFED”) was formed in April 2026 as part of the Trump Administration’s whole-of-government approach to combatting fraud.
- Since its formation, NFED has consistently communicated its commitment to aggressively addressing fraud that impacts federal government interests, particularly in the areas of health care, procurement, tax, and trade.
- NFED views its mandate expansively, has grown rapidly since its creation, and continues to evolve. NFED recently expressed its interest in pursuing corporate enforcement. But NFED’s overall effectiveness and specific willingness to take on large, complex corporate enforcement matters remain to be seen.
- While questions remain, companies should presume that NFED is actively seeking corporate enforcement matters to prosecute within its extensive purview.
In April 2026, then-Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche issued a memorandum creating the “National Fraud Enforcement Division,” whose “core mission” is “to zealously investigate and prosecute those who steal or fraudulently misuse taxpayer dollars.”
NFED was created to be a full DOJ litigating component, placing it alongside core DOJ litigating centers like the Criminal, Civil, Antitrust, National Security, and Civil Rights Divisions. Since April, NFED has grown, including by taking control of multiple areas previously supervised by the Criminal Division.
The President nominated and the Senate confirmed Colin M. McDonald to lead NFED. Multiple news articles report that McDonald has the backing of the White House and the Attorney General—and the resources that come with such support. Blanche directed NFED to “assume operational control of the Criminal Division’s Tax Section, the Health Care Fraud Unit, and the Market, Government, and Consumer Fraud Unit.” Blanche also ordered every U.S. Attorney’s Office to designate an “experienced prosecutor” to be “detailed-in-place” to NFED. In an August memorandum, McDonald committed to increasing NFED’s “headcount to approximately five hundred attorneys and staff.” Recent public reporting indicates that the Criminal Division is offering retention bonuses to stem departures to NFED.
In addition to these resources, NFED’s ambitions include making extensive use of technology. Although the Criminal Division previously touted its use of data analysis to identify fraudsters, McDonald claims to be “building the most sophisticated, innovative, and data-driven white-collar law enforcement component in the world.” NFED now includes a “National Fraud Detection Center” and a “Strategic Analysis Section.” These sub-components are designed to further NFED’s push to use data analytics, including artificial intelligence, to identify potential investigations.
NFED also created its own “Corporate Enforcement Section,” which is distinct from the Criminal Division’s “Corporate Enforcement and Compliance Unit.” That Criminal Division unit sits within the former Fraud Section, which is now called the “White Collar and Corporate Enforcement Section.” Operational dividing lines between NFED and other DOJ divisions are still somewhat unclear, but Criminal Division prosecutors working on corporate enforcement matters are expected to partner with the Criminal Division’s Corporate Enforcement and Compliance Unit. Attorneys from NFED’s prosecuting sections working on corporate enforcement matters will partner with NFED’s Corporate Enforcement Section, which is expected to play a significant role throughout the lifecycle of corporate matters pursued by NFED, including having primary responsibility for evaluating a company’s compliance with the terms of resolutions.
The October 1 Directive on Corporate Enforcement
On October 1, McDonald issued “Directive 26-12: Corporate Enforcement in the Fight Against Fraud” (the “October 1 Directive”). It commits NFED to “zealously prosecut[ing] corporate actors that defraud taxpayers and the United States,” while “firmly guard[ing] against overbroad corporate enforcement.”
The October 1 Directive reminds NFED prosecutors to prioritize the areas of health care, procurement, tax, and trade when determining which corporate investigations to pursue.
The October 1 Directive confirmed that NFED will follow traditional DOJ policies and guidance regarding corporate enforcement, such as the DOJ-wide Corporate Enforcement Policy (“CEP”) and the Justice Manual’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations. Yet the October 1 Directive instructed NFED prosecutors to also consider 10 additional factors when “recommending appropriate outcomes in corporate matters.” The first three factors are whether: (1) corporate management knew of or was involved in the fraud; (2) efforts were taken to conceal the fraud from the government or auditors, or through other obstructive means; and (3) the conduct “furthers” a scheme “lasting three years or more.” Another factor directs NFED prosecutors to prioritize conduct that harms 25 or more victims or results in $25 million or more in losses. Some of the remaining factors—such as actions that threaten military readiness, conduct that benefits foreign adversaries, and immigration offenses—reflect other Administration policy priorities. These factors are non-exhaustive, and prosecutors “may consider any other relevant factor, consistent with the Justice Manual.”
The October 7 Directive on the Division’s Comprehensive Approach
On October 7, McDonald issued “Directive 26-13,” which instructs NFED “prosecutors to deploy a comprehensive approach to combatting, investigating, and prosecuting fraud in all its forms” (the “October 7 Directive”). This directive again references the core priority areas of health care, procurement, tax, and trade. But the press release accompanying it proclaims that the “directive marks a significant operational shift, requiring [NFED’s] prosecutors to attack fraud from all angles using the Division’s tax, securities fraud, consumer fraud, and cybercrime authorities.”
The October 7 Directive states that companies and individuals that have benefited from “U.S. taxpayer funds or federal agency approvals” often engage in fraud that harms federal programs, the financial markets, and taxpayers. As noted below, this broad framing could affect how NFED approaches its corporate enforcement work. The “consumer protection” aspect of NFED’s efforts is set to target “scams” relating to “health care, consumer products, medical device or pharmaceutical schemes, service members, and schemes to defraud the United States.” The direction to confront “fraud from all angles” includes not only bringing “common fraud charges,” but also bringing any other charge that “fully dismantle[s] the fraud schemes and networks [NFED] investigates” and making aggressive use of “asset seizures and injunctions against fraud.”
The New Whistleblower Incentive Program
The October 1 Directive ordered NFED leadership to “design and implement policies and programs that appropriately incentivize whistleblowers to bring forward credible information pertaining to fraud.” On October 20, the Whistleblower Incentive Program (“WHIP”) was announced. The program will pay individuals $10,000 to $30,000 for information that leads to criminal charges (not convictions) relating to: (1) “Federal health care offenses and related crimes involving health care benefit programs or fraud against patients or others in the health care industry”; or (2) fraud on federal programs administered by the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Education, Veterans Affairs, or War, as well as the Small Business Administration. Notably, a WHIP award does not bar later payments under programs more closely tied to a matter’s resolution, such as the Criminal Division’s Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program.
NFED’s website explains WHIP eligibility and conditions. The guidance states that the program “places a particular emphasis on submissions involving . . . hospice, home health care, day care, and special services fraud.” These are not areas likely to result in significant corporate enforcement matters. But presumably a tip that leads to charges against a corporation or its employees for fraud related to a federal program administered by one of the identified agencies, or for a covered health care offense, could still result in a WHIP award. And, as the guidance notes, the program “could, in the future, be expanded to include additional categories of fraud.”
NFED has yet to operate in spaces that traditionally generate significant corporate enforcement matters. This could shift. Those seeking to decipher how NFED will pursue its corporate enforcement aims should watch the following areas closely:
- Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). NFED has interpreted its four enforcement priorities broadly. The October 1 Directive identifies health care as one of its priorities, stating that NFED will focus on “[f]raud schemes involving the health care industry, including health care fraud, distribution of controlled substances, and violations of the [FDCA].” NFED enforcement in this area may therefore overlap with the Criminal Division’s continuing FDCA enforcement activities. It will be important to monitor whether this overlap, together with NFED’s focus on the FDCA, leads to increased enforcement risk, and to learn more about how NFED and the Criminal Division will divide responsibility for corporate FDCA enforcement matters, particularly in cases involving drug or device safety that do not fit squarely within NFED’s remit.
- NFED’s View of “Securities Fraud and Market Misconduct.” The October 7 Directive states that companies that “benefit from U.S. taxpayer funds or federal agency approvals—whether large-scale procurement contracts, federal health care insurance programs, or authorizations by regulatory agencies like the U.S. Food and Drug Administration—simultaneously defraud the government, abuse the trust placed in federal programs, exploit U.S. markets, and bilk taxpayer dollars.” The Directive then notes that NFED’s Public Trust and Financial Integrity Section will “target and prioritize securities fraud schemes and market misconduct” related to: “government programs or contracts; schemes to defraud the United States; foreign investment schemes targeting the federal government; schemes targeting U.S. service members; and schemes involving health care, tax, or trade fraud.” This is a broad commitment to cover wide terrain. Doing so would require extensive resources and expertise. It will be worth watching whether NFED can successfully build corporate enforcement cases in any, let alone all, of these areas.
- NFED’s Execution of the CEP and Promotion of Voluntary Self-Disclosure. The October 1 Directive emphasizes that NFED will follow DOJ’s existing corporate enforcement policies, including the CEP. But NFED lacks a corporate resolution track record, so questions remain. For example, how quickly or efficiently will NFED resolve corporate matters? How will the 10 additional factors from the October 1 Directive intersect with other CEP considerations? Will there be benefits to disclosing misconduct to NFED that are unrelated to the CEP? How will voluntary disclosures to other agencies be handled? Recent guidance addresses this last question as it relates to health care companies. In an October 15, 2026 memorandum, NFED explained that a company making a voluntary self-disclosure to NFED’s Health Care Fraud Section will also receive the benefits offered under the Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (“HHS-OIG”) Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure Protocol. A single disclosure to NFED secures the benefits of both the CEP and the HHS-OIG protocol.
- Intersection of NFED Inquiries and the Civil Division’s False Claims Act (“FCA”) Enforcement. DOJ’s Civil Division continues to pursue civil FCA enforcement. Traditionally, if both a criminal and a civil DOJ component are pursuing parallel inquiries, the civil matter will trail the criminal matter. NFED’s stated objective to vigorously prosecute fraud matters may increase the number of FCA matters affected by parallel proceedings. How NFED and the Civil Division navigate parallel investigations may provide insight into the degree to which DOJ will prioritize NFED’s role in corporate enforcement. In addition, on October 22, 2026, the Civil Division announced a new pilot program to incentivize voluntary disclosure of FCA violations by health care providers, suppliers, manufacturers, payers, and others in the industry. The pilot program offers disclosing parties the benefits of a coordinated civil release from the Civil Division for the disclosed FCA violations and favorable terms for a financial resolution. The announcement states that the program is limited to disclosure of civil violations, and that a company that wants to disclose “potential criminal conduct related to health care must disclose that conduct to the [NFED].” Therefore, companies considering voluntary disclosure of a civil FCA violation predicated on an underlying violation of a criminal statute (e.g., the FDCA or the Anti-Kickback Statute) should consider also disclosing to NFED, consistent with the October 15, 2026 NFED memorandum. Additional considerations for health care companies considering potential disclosure to the Civil Division under the pilot program are available here.
- Investigating Tax Offenses. Federal law restricts when and how government attorneys can access tax records. DOJ’s now-defunct Tax Division previously played the central role in helping federal prosecutors navigate those restrictions. Line prosecutors sometimes lacked incentive to investigate tax offenses alongside fraud theories because doing so required working with an additional DOJ component on charges that were unlikely to result in additional recovery. NFED now oversees DOJ’s criminal tax work. The October 7 Directive orders NFED prosecutors to assess, in every case, “whether there is reason to believe that a violation of the internal revenue laws has occurred.” If NFED prosecutors determine that tax charges may “materially advance the investigation, prosecution, or recovery of assets,” they are directed to invite Internal Revenue Service criminal investigators to join the inquiry. This directive is NFED-wide and not specifically tied to corporate enforcement. But it may result in more frequent review of tax records in all types of NFED inquiries, including those involving corporate entities.
While questions remain, NFED’s growth and recent directives provide immediate takeaways:
- Companies should operate on the assumption that NFED is seeking corporate enforcement matters. NFED has consistently explained that it plans to vigorously prosecute fraud on the public fisc, particularly in the areas of health care, procurement, tax, and trade. NFED’s recent pronouncements indicate that it will likely take a broad view of what it means to benefit from or defraud the government. Companies should presume that NFED is actively looking for cases to prosecute—and that it is doing so with an expansive view of its mandate.
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Companies should pressure-test internal controls and reporting structures. Given the new incentives NFED offers to whistleblowers, entities that work in NFED’s priority areas, otherwise receive federal funds, or operate in highly regulated industries should pressure-test their internal fraud detection and reporting systems and their policies for addressing internal complaints.
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Companies should treat communications with regulatory agencies with care. Companies should carefully consider whether employees who engage in formal and informal communications with government representatives have received adequate training and whether processes are in place to provide sufficient oversight of such interactions. Companies should continue to exercise caution when submitting certifications or making representations to the government and its agents and be aware that such interactions may be scrutinized in any investigation.
- Companies should pay close attention to NFED information requests. Companies should take seriously any NFED inquiries or data requests, such as voluntary information requests, grand jury subpoenas, or warrants—regardless of whether the corporate entity appears to be the initial subject of the request.