On November 13, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) published a substantial new batch of advisory opinions concerning the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”). The release is notable because it is DOJ’s first formal publication of FARA advisory opinions during the second Trump Administration.
DOJ uploaded 31 advisory-opinion files. Eighteen were opinions that appeared in an earlier group of opinions that DOJ briefly posted and then removed from its website last year, which we analyzed previously. The remaining files reflect about a dozen new opinions, including one opinion posted in multiple categories.
The publication itself is significant. It comes shortly after DOJ announced that it will proceed with “many, but not all” of the provisions in the pending Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) regarding FARA and warned that it will pursue “civil and criminal liability” for FARA noncompliance. Against that backdrop, the release signals that DOJ is again providing public guidance on how it interprets and applies the statute.
Advisory opinions remain one of the few public windows into how DOJ applies FARA’s broad and often ambiguous terms, and these offer considerably more evidence about how the current FARA Unit is applying the statute and existing regulations in practice. Although the opinions address a range of recurring issues, several themes stand out, including DOJ’s continued focus on foreign-government involvement in assessing agency and the commercial exemptions, its emphasis on the substance rather than the labels of contractual relationships, and its relatively narrow readings of the national-security and lawyers’ exemptions.
A few developments are especially notable. First, DOJ continues to apply the current commercial exemption regulation to for-profit entities, but the new opinions underscore the substantial weight DOJ gives to foreign government involvement. Where the activities are directed by a foreign government or promote governmental interests, including a foreign country’s investment interests, DOJ has taken a narrow view of the exemptions. Second, DOJ stated expressly that FARA is “comprehensive, applying equally to agents of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly governments,” and that a campaign’s consistency with U.S. policy “has no bearing” on whether FARA applies. That position may come as a surprise to companies and organizations working with close U.S. allies, particularly where their activities affirmatively advance U.S. foreign-policy or national-security objectives. DOJ’s message is that geopolitical alignment does not itself reduce FARA risk, and activities undertaken for an allied foreign government remain subject to the same statutory analysis. Third, DOJ appears to be carving pardon work by lawyers out of FARA’s lawyers’ exemption. It concluded that a clemency application to be submitted to DOJ’s own Pardon Attorney fell outside the exemption, even though the application grew out of exempt criminal defense work and the lawyers planned to stay within the Pardon Attorney process, a surprising further narrowing of the exemption.
We discuss these and other developments below, along with their implications for companies, nonprofits, law firms, public affairs firms, and others whose work may implicate FARA.
An April 6, 2026 opinion illustrates how DOJ may find a foreign-government agency relationship even where the government does not directly retain or instruct the U.S. agent. The opinion involved an international conglomerate, its foreign subsidiary, a former in-house government affairs executive, and the Washington public affairs firm he later joined. As an employee, he oversaw U.S. government relations activities for the conglomerate and its subsidiary and participated in events promoting investment in the subsidiary, other businesses in the foreign country, and the country generally. After he joined the firm, it was retained to continue that work, including inviting U.S. officials to events promoting investment in the company’s foreign operating markets.
The critical facts arose from a congressional meeting the firm arranged to discuss the conglomerate’s commercial interests. Two days beforehand, the company executive invited a foreign-government delegation, including the country’s Ambassador, to attend and instructed the firm and former employee to coordinate the delegation’s participation with the congressional office. The individual sought to keep the meeting commercial, declining to change its timing because doing so “could be perceived as him acting on behalf of or at the direction of the [foreign] government.” The officials nevertheless attended, and the discussion expanded to sanctions and other matters concerning the foreign country and U.S. foreign relations.
DOJ concluded that the individual and firm were agents of both the conglomerate and the foreign government. It reasoned that the company executive, the individual’s manager and client, had “expanded the scope of the activities” by directing the company and its agents to “serve as a liaison” between the foreign government and U.S. officials.
That conclusion largely resolved the exemption questions. The commercial exemptions failed because the activities were political, directly promoted the foreign government’s public interests, and were partly directed by that government. The Lobbying Disclosure Act (“LDA”) exemption failed because the foreign government was itself a foreign principal and the “principal beneficiary” of the activity. As a result, the public affairs firm and the individual were required to register under FARA.
The opinion also highlighted an important point regarding individual and organizational obligations to satisfy FARA. The conglomerate itself registered under FARA as an agent of the foreign government, identifying only a company executive as having performed services, and later reported that the relationship had ended. The FARA Unit concluded that registration did not resolve the separate obligations of the U.S. public affairs firm or the individual, which depended on their own activities. DOJ nevertheless treated the conglomerate’s registration as a “further indication,” though “not determinative with respect to the obligations of others,” that they too had been acting as agents of the foreign government through the company. DOJ noted that the individual could satisfy his obligation arising from his former in-house work through a short-form registration statement under the conglomerate’s registration, while the firm was required to register in its own right.
Importantly, DOJ said the firm could terminate its FARA registration if its future work focused on the private company’s own investments rather than broader investment in the foreign country, did not involve foreign-government officials, and did not principally benefit the foreign government.
A January 22, 2026 opinion similarly reads FARA’s agency definition broadly and the commercial exemptions narrowly where private-sector activity intersects with foreign-government interests. There, a U.S. private equity firm was establishing an approximately $10 billion infrastructure fund, with a foreign sovereign wealth fund expected to serve initially as its sole investor and then as an anchor investor. The U.S. firm retained a public affairs company to engage U.S. officials, including to obtain recognition that the sovereign wealth fund’s investments advanced the foreign country’s commitments under a bilateral arrangement with the United States.
DOJ found an agency relationship with the sovereign wealth fund even though the fund “will not directly manage” the public affairs firm. The public affairs firm was controlled by the U.S. private equity firm through contract, while the private equity firm would initially be “controlled, financed, and subsidized” by the sovereign wealth fund. For DOJ, that chain was enough.
DOJ also concluded that neither of FARA’s two commercial exemptions applied. The first covers purely private, nonpolitical commercial activity. The outreach did not qualify because it would promote the foreign country’s interest in receiving credit under its agreement with the United States, which the FARA Unit deemed political activity. The second covers activity that does not “serv[e] predominantly a foreign interest.” DOJ’s current regulation generally treats political activity on behalf of a foreign corporation’s bona fide commercial operations as qualifying, so long as the activity is not directed by a foreign government and does not directly promote the public or political interests of a foreign government. Treating the sovereign wealth fund, which DOJ described as a government unit that operates like a corporation, as a foreign corporation for this purpose, DOJ held that the regulation did not help here because the outreach would directly promote the foreign country’s public and political interest in meeting its commitments under the bilateral agreement.
DOJ then went further, concluding that even if the sovereign wealth fund were viewed solely as part of the foreign government, so that the regulation’s corporate test did not apply, the outreach would still “predominantly serve” the foreign country’s interest because any benefit to the U.S. private equity firm would be “derivative of the benefit to [the foreign country] from the FARA activity that had taken place.” Put simply, the fact that a U.S. company also stands to gain does not take an activity outside FARA if the activity directly promotes the interest of a foreign government.
That reasoning is consistent with DOJ’s earlier narrow reading of the commercial exemption where sovereign wealth funds are involved. In a 2019 opinion, for example, DOJ concluded that a sovereign wealth fund’s interests were “inextricably connected to the public interests” of its government because its “core function is to generate funds” for that government, making it “not a commercial business that happens to be state-owned.”
The January opinion’s analysis is notable against the backdrop of DOJ’s still-pending 2025 NPRM. The NPRM would replace the current regulatory framework described above with a broader, multifactor inquiry into whether activities predominantly serve a domestic rather than foreign interest.
The January opinion does not purport to implement the proposed rule, and its facts involve a sovereign wealth fund with a direct connection to a foreign government. But DOJ’s focus on whether the U.S. company’s benefit was merely “derivative” of a foreign benefit echoes the broader predominant-interest analysis proposed in the NPRM. That may be an important indication of how DOJ is thinking about the commercial exemption as it considers the new rule.
A July 6, 2026, opinion underscores that carefully drafted FARA safeguards will not necessarily control where the operative provisions of an agreement point in the other direction.
In that opinion, a U.S. entity entered into a cooperation agreement with a foreign government ministry to establish a “strategic alliance” for “the promotion of investments, exports, and tourism.” Among other things, the agreement required the U.S. entity to promote investment under the ministry’s policies and strategies, represent the ministry at certain events, report progress, and participate in a jointly developed work program. The ministry, in turn, would “supervise the promotional actions” undertaken under the agreement.
The parties simultaneously adopted a detailed FARA compliance annex that appeared designed to address potential FARA concerns. It disclaimed any “agency, representation, employment, delegation, or mandate relationship,” gave the U.S. entity “full and total discretion” over its activities, empowered a compliance officer to block activity presenting FARA risk, and characterized any benefit to the foreign country as “merely incidental” to the U.S. entity’s commercial interests.
DOJ was unpersuaded. It looked past the disclaimers to the substantive obligations in the underlying agreement, concluding that they required the U.S. entity to undertake covered activities for the foreign ministry. DOJ likewise rejected the commercial exemption because those activities would advance the parties’ “strategic alliance” to “attract[] investment and promot[e] the economic development” of the foreign country and therefore “directly promote the public or political interests” of its government.
The opinion illustrates the limits of contractual FARA safeguards. Disclaimers, independence provisions, and compliance procedures may reduce risk, but DOJ will look to the agreement as a whole and to the authority and obligations it actually creates. Notably, DOJ had reached the opposite conclusion in an earlier opinion involving the same requestor under materially different arrangements.
An August 13, 2025 opinion, followed by a September 17 denial of reconsideration, addresses FARA’s rarely invoked national-security exemption. A U.S. strategic communications firm proposed to work as a subcontractor on a foreign-government-funded nationwide campaign using television, print, digital advertising, social media, paid influencers, audience research, and other communications designed to affect U.S. public opinion.
DOJ rejected the argument that the campaign fell outside FARA because it supported an allied government and aligned with U.S. policy. FARA, DOJ emphasized, is “comprehensive, applying equally to agents of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly governments.” It likewise rejected the suggestion that covered communications must amount to “pernicious propaganda.”
DOJ then took a categorical approach to the national-security exemption, which exempts certain activity for a foreign government whose defense the President deems vital to U.S. defense. Under 28 C.F.R. § 5.305, DOJ explained, the exemption “shall not be available unless the President has, by publication in the Federal Register,” designated the relevant country. Because no such designation had been made, DOJ concluded that the exemption was unavailable.
DOJ doubled down on reconsideration, stating that whether the campaign was “pressing, moral, or consistent with U.S. government policy has no bearing on the application of FARA.” The Department emphasized that registration does not prohibit the communications, but instead provides disclosure of their foreign source.
The opinions make clear that close alignment between a foreign government and the United States, even on significant national-security issues, does not itself establish an exemption. Unless the President has made the designation required by DOJ’s regulation, the national-security exemption remains unavailable.
A March 11, 2026, opinion addresses the lawyers’ exemption in the context of clemency work.
The opinion involved a law firm that had represented a former foreign diplomat in connection with a federal criminal indictment. The firm had sought dismissal on diplomatic immunity grounds, and a foreign ministry paid its invoices. DOJ acknowledged that this earlier work “appears to have fit within the attorney-representation exemption” because it involved qualified lawyers representing a disclosed foreign principal before a court and prosecutors in connection with judicial and criminal law enforcement proceedings.
The firm then proposed to seek a presidential pardon. Its planned application would rely heavily on the same diplomatic immunity arguments, including a foreign ministry declaration asserting that the prosecution implicated the foreign country’s own interests under the Vienna Convention. DOJ concluded that the pardon advocacy constituted both political activity and representation of a foreign principal before the U.S. government. The firm’s statement that it would not seek to influence broader U.S. policy did not alter the result because, DOJ explained, FARA’s political activities definition also covers efforts to influence U.S. officials “with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country.”
Most importantly, DOJ refused to treat the pardon request as part of the exempt criminal representation. It characterized a pardon as an executive “act of grace” and the application as a “discrete effort separate from representation in a criminal prosecution.” Clemency, DOJ noted, is handled through a separate process with the President as decision-maker and is not an “intrinsic or even common task” in criminal defense.
The pardon work therefore went beyond “the bounds of normal legal representation.” Analyzed independently, it also fell outside the exemption because it involved advocacy outside a judicial, law enforcement, or qualifying on-the-record agency proceeding and sought to advance the foreign government’s political or public interests.
The result is striking because the requestors represented that the application would be “directed to the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice” and that, unless that office advised otherwise, they did not plan to contact other persons or government components. For lawyers representing foreign clients, the opinion illustrates that an advocacy effort does not necessarily fall within the lawyers’ exemption simply because it grows out of the same underlying legal dispute. DOJ’s analysis instead turns on the nature of the particular advocacy and the forum in which it occurs.
Taken together, the new opinions provide the clearest indication yet of how the current FARA Unit is approaching several recurring FARA questions. They reflect particular scrutiny where foreign-government interests enter an otherwise commercial arrangement, whether indirectly through a client executive’s direction, a sovereign wealth fund investor, or a cooperation agreement with a foreign ministry, and continued skepticism toward contractual provisions that do not match the substance of the relationship. They also confirm that DOJ applies FARA to allied governments in the same way as to adversaries, and that DOJ is reading the lawyers’ exemption narrowly, even for clemency work that remains within DOJ’s own process. Companies, nonprofits, law firms, public affairs firms, and others operating near FARA’s boundaries should treat these opinions as useful guideposts in assessing their own activities.
If you have any questions concerning the material discussed in this client alert, please contact the following members of our Election & Political Law practice.