On October 4, 2026, more than 125 million Brazilian voters cast their votes in the first-round elections for a new president and all state governors, and elected all members of the House of Deputies, two-thirds of the Federal Senate, and all state-level representatives.
Voters delivered a historic victory for the right, in particular to former president Jair Bolsonaro and his family and supporters. Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the former president’s son and the main opposition presidential candidate, received 56 million votes or 47.03% of the total, surpassing incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who totaled a little less than 54 million votes or 45.16%. This is the first time that the candidate leading the polls—President Lula—finished the first round in second place. In addition, both Michelle Bolsonaro, the former president’s wife, and Carlos Bolsonaro, another of his sons, were elected to the Senate; while his brother, Renato Bolsonaro, and his youngest son, Jair Renan Bolsonaro, secured House seats.
More importantly, former president Bolsonaro’s right-leaning Liberal Party (“PL”) will substantially increase its seats in both chambers of Congress. It will grow from 98 to 121 seats in the House, and from 12 to 28 in the Senate—in both cases, the largest gain for a single party. PL is now the largest party in both chambers of Congress. While President Lula’s left-leaning Workers’ Party (“PT”) remains the second in both chambers, it is followed by a number of other center-right and right-leaning parties. In practice, the right and center-right parties will increase their control of Congress.
In addition, at least 20 of the 27 gubernatorial races were decided in the first round, a record. PL elected at least five governors, the most of any party, will control all three states in the South and two states in the Amazon forest region and, in one of the most stunning upsets of this cycle, will likely win the gubernatorial race in the key state of Rio de Janeiro. Republicanos, another right-leaning party connected to one of Brazil’s largest evangelical churches, elected three governors and will control the country’s two largest states—São Paulo and Minas Gerais—and its largest agribusiness state (Mato Grosso). President Lula’s PT also elected three governors, but only one in a key state (Bahia).
While the presidential race and at least six of the 27 gubernatorial races will go to a runoff, with voters casting their final votes on October 25, 2026, the right’s electoral victory—the largest since Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985 and the establishment of a democratic constitution in 1988—already impacts political and policy dynamics.
While it is not clear whether President Lula will be able to reverse his first-round defeat in three weeks, it is likely that his pending policy agenda in Congress will be impacted during this period. This might impact, in particular, the voting on a draft constitutional amendment that would reduce the existing 44-hour workweek cap to 40 work hours per week, and the six-day workweek cap to five workdays per week. The amendment, a key policy priority for the Lula administration, is criticized by private sector groups and part of the right.
The right’s electoral victory might also create an incentive for a reduction of perceived Supreme Court judicial activism, an aspect frequently criticized by opposition parties during President Lula’s administration. PL candidates campaigned heavily on the impeachment of justices deemed partial or corrupt, and on reforms to curb the perceived abuses of the Court. It is possible that certain justices will feel less compelled to decide on matters that are deemed too politically contentious and will instead try to find an accommodation with the right’s newly-elected congressional leadership. It is also possible that certain other justices feel more compelled to decide matters of interest to the right.
The long-term impact of the right’s electoral victory is closely connected to the final result of the presidential race. On one hand, if President Lula wins reelection for a fourth term, he will face a Congress controlled by the right-leaning parties and a Senate with just enough members willing to impeach Supreme Court justices. His current administration’s strategy of seeking Supreme Court action to bypass congressional inaction (or overcome votes contrary to the administration’s policy priorities) would likely be constrained. In addition, his negotiations to establish a congressional coalition would likely leave the administration in a weak bargaining position, resulting in a protracted policy agenda.
On the other hand, if Senator Flávio Bolsonaro wins the runoff, he will have a robust electoral mandate to pursue an ambitious policy agenda and an easier path to negotiating a large congressional coalition—though he would still need to win over the support of a number of legislators with less ideological affinity or who may be wary of less popular policy proposals, especially on the economy. In this scenario, the left-leaning opposition would be severely constrained and would have limited procedural, political, and policy options.
A victory by President Lula and a protracted fourth mandate would likely result in a narrow domestic policy agenda combined with an even more active foreign policy, as the presidency largely controls Brazil’s international relations. A fourth Lula administration would probably insist on a lax fiscal policy—even if it accepts the need for fiscal adjustment—continue the implementation of the 2023 consumption tax system reform and the regulation of digital companies, and pursue policy items that are typically sponsored by the right, such as the fight against organized crime.
However, if Senator Flávio Bolsonaro wins, his administration would likely pursue a broader policy agenda and a closer alignment of Brazil’s foreign policy with the United States—while having to tow the line of not alienating China, a country that is still Brazil’s largest export market and of particular importance to the agribusiness sector (one of Senator Bolsonaro’s key allied groups). The domestic policy agenda would probably focus on economic reforms to reduce government spending and, potentially, tax cuts and a stronger privatization program. These could take the form of reforms to social security entitlement, government human resources, and social programs, as well as changes to the 2023 consumption tax system reform and further changes to income and payroll taxes. His administration would also probably focus on reforming the judiciary branch, in particular the Supreme Court, and might revise recent digital companies’ regulations.
A Flávio Bolsonaro administration would also probably fulfill campaign promises such as granting pardons or commutations to former president Jair Bolsonaro and the January 8, 2023, rioters; and the impeachment of certain Supreme Court justices. This political agenda might further polarize the country and divert the administration’s focus, time, and political capital away from economic reforms, in particular those aimed at reducing government spending.
In any scenario, a Congress more firmly controlled by the right will probably continue with its pro-business agenda of approving and reforming sector-specific legal frameworks, as well as increasing tax and financial incentives, to unlock private sector investment. In addition, right-leaning governors in the largest Brazilian states will likely implement ambitious deregulation, privatization, and concessions programs, including for foreign investors.
If you have any questions concerning the materials discussed in this update, please contact the following members of our Brazil Initiative team.
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