On June 29, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Trump v. Slaughter that statutory “for-cause” removal protections for Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) unconstitutionally impair the President’s authority over Executive policy-making functions of the U.S. Government. Slaughter provides new authority for the view that the similar protections afforded to Commissioners of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) are likewise unconstitutional and unenforceable.
The CPSC’s loss of statutory independence from presidential authority would have direct consequences for all CPSC Commissioners, irrespective of political party, who would be subject to firing at will. For other stakeholders, it would mean focusing not only on the Commission, but increasingly on Executive Branch organizations including the White House, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Department of Justice (DOJ), to forecast and influence CPSC rulemakings, enforcement policy, and priorities.
The Slaughter case arose in March 2025 when President Trump fired FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter. The removal prompted a lawsuit by Slaughter based on Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which upheld the FTC Act’s removal restriction. The law provides that the President may remove FTC Commissioners for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U.S.C. § 41. The consistency of for-cause protections with constitutional separation of powers has been debated for some time, and in 2020 the Supreme Court struck down removal protections in the context of a single-head agency. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197 (2020). After the district court ruled in Slaughter’s favor on the basis that Humphrey’s Executor rather than Seila Law controlled the case, the Supreme Court issued a stay and granted review of the separation-of-powers dispute.
In its new decision, the Court extensively reviewed the history of presidential removals of constitutional officers. On the basis of that history and the Framers’ constitutional design, the Court overruled Humphrey’s Executor as an anomaly and further held that “[t]he FTC’s for-cause removal provision violates the separation of powers. In its present form, the FTC enforces and administers some 80 statutes, which cover almost every facet of our Nation’s economy. The tasks it undertakes are the very essence of execution of the law—precisely the President’s constitutional role.” Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, slip op. at 25 (June 29, 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similar to the FTC Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) provides that “Any member of the Commission may be removed by the President for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office but for no other cause.” 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a). In May 2025, despite that provision, President Trump terminated the agency’s three Democratic members before their terms expired. Those Commissioners had recently voted to move forward with Federal Register publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking on a safety standard for lithium-ion batteries in “micromobility products” such as e-bikes and e-scooters. Publishing the proposed rule conflicted with a February 2025 Executive Order that had directed independent agencies to begin clearing their rulemakings through OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
In ensuing litigation captioned Boyle v. Trump, the three removed Commissioners allege violations of the CPSA’s for-cause removal protections. While a federal district court ordered their reinstatement, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the reinstatement order, allowing the removals to stand while the constitutional challenge continues. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has been holding Boyle in abeyance while awaiting the outcome of Slaughter.
In the Boyle case, the removed CPSC Commissioners have emphasized “the close similarities between the agency and the FTC as discussed in Humphrey’s Executor.” Accordingly, Slaughter suggests that CPSC Commissioners, like FTC Commissioners, lack tenure protection. Functionally, they would be the President’s at-will employees. The 2025 firings show how this can have significant safety consequences. After President Trump’s removal of the Democratic Commissioners, Republican Acting Chairman Feldman and Republican Commissioner Dziak, following a new Trump Administration policy, pulled the proposed lithium-ion battery rule (which all five CPSC Commissioners substantively supported) from public comment and submitted it to OIRA for interagency review. The Administration’s ensuing review has delayed the public comment process for the better part of a year, potentially resulting in additional injuries and deaths from lithium-ion battery fires and other hazards, without substantive changes in the proposed rule.
Congress expressly established the CPSC as an “independent regulatory commission,” 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a), with power to establish safety standards, mandate recalls through adjudications subject to judicial review, and investigate and penalize prohibited acts such as selling recalled products and failing to timely report potential product hazards. Yet Acting Chairman Feldman refers to “President Trump’s CPSC.” After Slaughter, separation from White House control may be obsolete unless a future President voluntarily restores it as a policy decision. (And even then, it is hard to imagine true independence from the White House when the President can always change their mind.)
In that environment industry should expect faster and closer alignment between the CPSC and each new Administration. In general, this likely means more aggressive safety rulemaking during Democratic presidencies and a focus on enforcement priorities and terminating rulemakings during Republican presidencies. Then policy swings that Congress sought to constrain and slow through CPSC’s removal protections and bi-partisan composition may become more extreme when dissent is a firing offense.
Making CPSC directly accountable to the President may reduce Congress’s influence in Commissioner nominations. When being in the President’s good graces matters for job security, candidates seeking and winning a nomination to fill a Commission vacancy might well come with stronger ties to the Executive Branch than the Legislative Branch.
Under the CPSA, “three members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that if there are only three members serving on the Commission because of vacancies in the Commission, two members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and if there are only two members serving on the Commission because of vacancies in the Commission, two members shall constitute a quorum for the six month period beginning on the date of the vacancy which caused the number of Commission members to decline to two.” 15 U.S.C. § 2053(d). With Acting Chairman Feldman as its only Commissioner, CPSC currently lacks a quorum to do business. Notwithstanding a nominal workaround, the agency’s ability to adopt, amend, or repeal its legislative rules, or to resolve cases as an adjudicator, is very much in doubt. In the near term, the pending nominations of Karen Sessions and current CPSC Executive Director Brien Lorenze, if timely confirmed by the Senate, promise to fix the quorum problem.
Looking further ahead, though, the intersection of the CPSA and Slaughter promises difficulties. The CPSA’s restriction on presidential appointments (which is not at issue in Boyle but could be subject to a future constitutional challenge) states that “Not more than three of the Commissioners shall be affiliated with the same political party.” 15 U.S.C. § 2053(c). If future Presidents continue President Trump’s practice of maintaining control of the CPSC through removal and the limit on same-party nominations survives a potential constitutional challenge, then three Commissioners of the President’s party would probably become the norm for a fully staffed Commission. If the same-party limit does not survive, then Presidents might want to fill the Commission with as many as five appointees of their party.
A three-Commissioner agency carries structural risk inasmuch as a single Commissioner’s departure would leave the CPSC without a quorum after six months. Further, if the President and Senate majority are of different political parties, and if both believe that a constrained CPSC is better than a CPSC controlled by the other party, then impasse is likely: The President would discharge Commissioners of the other party and the Senate would refuse to confirm the President’s replacement nominees, leaving the CPSC without a quorum for extended periods. Even with two new Commissioners, such a scenario could play out as early as 2027 if Acting Chairman Feldman leaves the Commission at the end of his current term in October 2026 and Democrats take control of the Senate.
The nature of the CPSC also suggests it may regularly face quorum issues. Unlike the Federal Communications Commission or Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, for example, CPSC does not have licensing responsibilities that industry deems essential, making it more realistic that the President and Senate might remain at an impasse.
While the President’s FY 2026 Budget proposed folding CPSC into the Department of Health and Human Services, there has been no visible Congressional movement on that proposal. One plausible scenario is that there will be a maximum of three Commissioners for the remainder of President Trump’s second term, with the possibility of another extended no-quorum period. This will make it important for the Republican Commissioners to stay aligned—and after Slaughter the clearest way to do that is to follow the Administration’s lead. Given the lack of strong White House interest in CPSC matters since 2025, this is a recipe for continuation of the current quiet period for CPSC rulemaking, with the agency continuing its focus on recalls, civil penalty settlement agreements, and enforcement actions through DOJ.
In recent years both Democratic and Republican Commissioners have supported enforcement of existing requirements. Litigation to enforce CPSC’s statutes and regulations will continue to be filed by DOJ rather than the Commission itself. Bringing the CPSC under the same White House direction as DOJ is likely to facilitate greater coordination between the two agencies.
The CPSA will continue to identify CPSC as “an independent regulatory commission,” 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a), but Slaughter challenges the institutional autonomy Congress sought to create. Industry should be prepared for a more volatile regulatory environment tied more closely to election cycles. Businesses may wish to devote greater resources to monitoring and influencing the product safety priorities of an incoming or incumbent Administration. Waves of CPSC rulemaking and administrative adjudication, punctuated by periods of relative inactivity, can be expected as the agency gains and loses quorums of Commissioners. Additional clarity should emerge as the Boyle litigation concludes and the Commission’s membership stabilizes—but a fundamental shift in CPSC’s relationship to the Executive Branch appears to be occuring.
If you have any questions concerning the material discussed in this client alert, please contact our Product Safety, Investigations, and Recalls practice group.
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